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Abstract
We study the problem of routing traffic through a congested network consisting of m parallel links, each having a certain speed.
Moreover, we are given n selfish (non-cooperative) agents, each of them willing to route her own piece of traffic on exactly one
link. Agents are selfish in that they only pick a link which minimize the delay of their own piece of traffic. In this context much
effort has been lavished in the framework of mixed Nash equilibria where the agent’s routing choices are regulated by probability
distributions, one for each agent, which let the system thus enter a steady state from which no agent is willing to unilaterally deviate.
In this work we consider situations in which some agents have constraints on the routing choice: in a sense they are forbidden to
route their traffic on some links. We show that at most one Nash equilibrium may exist and, in some cases with equal speed links
and where each agent is forbidden to route on at most one link, we give necessary and sufficient conditions on its existence; these
conditions correlate the traffic load of the agents. We consider also a dynamic behaviour of the network when the constraints may
vary, in particular when a constraint is removed: we establish under which conditions the network is still in equilibrium. These
conditions are all effective in the sense that, given a set of yes/no routing constraints on each link for each agent, we provide the
probability distributions corresponding to the unique Nash equilibrium associated to the constraints (if it exists). Moreover these
conditions and the possible Nash equilibrium are computed in time O(mn).
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
We study the problem of routing traffic in a simple context derived from the so-called KP-model, proposed by
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou in [13]. We are given a network of m parallel links, each having a possibly different
and finite speed s1, . . . , sm of carrying the weights w1, . . . , wn of n agents. Each agent i wishes to route through a
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link her indivisible weight wi and has a cost (delay) given by the overall traffic (weights) routed by all the other agents
on that link at the given link rate.
In large networks, it is reasonable to assume a selfish behaviour of the agents in choosing the links on which
route their traffic, that is a lack of coordination (see [13,22]): thus each agent selfishly aims at minimizing her cost.
The problem sets naturally in a context of non-cooperative games where the routes chosen by the users form a Nash
equilibrium, in the sense of classical game theory: a steady state of the game [19]. If the choices of the agents are
deterministic, then the equilibrium is called pure, if these are randomized the equilibrium is mixed. In this latter case
the agent expected cost on a link that she chooses, takes into account her whole weight and the expected weight of
the other agents on that link. The probability distribution to route the traffic of an agent through the m links, is called
strategy for that agent. Each agent decides a strategy and the network enters a stochastic steady state (an equilibrium
point) from which each agent has no convenience to modify unilaterally her routing strategy: in game theory this is
called a mixed Nash equilibrium (see [19, Chapter 3] for various interpretations of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
and [18]). When the probabilities are all either 0 or 1, a strategy is pure otherwise it is mixed.
As remarked also in [20], no polynomial time algorithm is known to find a Nash equilibrium given a network of
links and agents, thus in [13] it has been noticed that if we are given a set of n supports, (a support is a vector of m
indicator variables associated to a strategy of an agent, indicating whether the agent routes her traffic with positive
probability or not on each of the m links) then at most one Nash equilibrium associated with these supports exists and
the equilibrium can be computed by solving a system of mn equations in mn unknowns.
In this paper we establish conditions on the existence of Nash equilibria, given mixed supports. We consider the
so-called restricted model, (sometimes called also subsetmodel [1]) where the traffic has some constraints: each agent
i cannot send her traffic on links belonging to a set Fi of forbidden links. In this case, since some links are forbidden
to some agents, in a Nash equilibrium these agents do not have to worry about the cost of routing their traffic on a
forbidden link: this is crucial for the meaning of our results. To better motivate our results, let us consider an equivalent
view of the network: each agent is connected to m sources and each source has a private link with a single destination.
We address situations that may arise from a total congestion or a fault of some links between agents and sources.
We investigate the following two questions:
(1) Under which conditions exists a Nash equilibrium when some agents are constrained not to route their weights on
some links?
(2) If, in an equilibrium situation, some links are no longer forbidden, but the agents choose not to route their weights
on those links, is the network still in the same equilibrium?
In particular, we give an answer to these questions in some systems with all identical links and where at most one link
is forbidden per each agent. The conditions we give correlate the agents weights and are necessary and sufficient for
the existence of an equilibrium. We also show which are the strategies of the agents in equilibrium, yielding thus the
conditions effective and computable in O(mn) time. Let us note that, when the constraints are relaxed, the verification
that the network is still in equilibrium is done in O(n) time. Since the problem we solve depends on the supports
given and since the number of different supports is exponential in mn, our results are given for classes of constraints
parameterized in the number of agents that will never route traffic on a link and in the number of links which will
never carry the traffic of some agents.
Related works. A good and complete survey paper on selfish routing in non-cooperative games is [4]. In [17]
necessary and sufficient conditions on the existence of fully mixed Nash equilibria have been given, that is the case
in which each agent has non-zero probability to route her traffic on all links (the conditions can be computed in
O(mn)). Since Nash equilibria often lead to a performance degradation of the network, in [13] (where the authors
also introduce the idea to calculate Nash equilibrium as a solution of linear equation system, see also [14]) it has
been proposed to measure this degradation in terms of coordination ratio: the ratio between the worst possible Nash
equilibrium and the value of the optimum performance of the network. A remarkable result has been given in [2]
establishing the asymptotically tight bound Θ( logmlog log logm ) on the coordination ratio for the general model of parallel
related links. See also [12] where the tight bounds on the coordination ratio have been given using a new probabilistic
tool called ball fusion. In [1] a model similar to ours, the subset model, is considered to give a full characterization
of the worst-case coordination ratio. Many other interesting results on this subject have been published: some of them
(see [10,11,22]) concern cases of pure or fully mixed strategies; the paper [3] concerns with the time the system takes
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to converge to a pure Nash equilibrium, while [4] deals with the problem of converting any given non-equilibrium
routing into a Nash equilibrium without increasing some measures of costs, a technique called Nashification. In [7]
a polynomial time algorithm is given to compute a pure Nash equilibrium in the restricted model with links with
equal speed (here, unlike from our setting, the agents can use only pure strategies during the game). The equilibrium
is reached using Nashification and techniques from the Preflow-Push algorithm and Blocking-Flows. Moreover they
show tight bounds on the coordination ratio for pure equilibria, in the same model. In [8] a natural conjecture asserting
that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium is the worst Nash equilibrium with respect to the social cost is proved. In [6]
a generalization of the KP-model to the weighted congestion games on the l-layered networks is introduced proving
that every weighted congestion game on such a network with resource delay equal to the congestion, possesses a
pure Nash equilibrium. In [15] and [9] a new model for selfish routing is studied: a model mixing the KP-model and
the Wardrop model for which they consider the “polynomial” social cost and prove the fully mixed Nash equilibrium
conjecture for identical users and two links. In [16] and [21] characterizations of networks having a unique equilibrium
are studied: in the former paper networks with two terminal nodes are considered, in the second it is assumed that the
cost functions satisfy some mild convexity conditions.
Organization of the paper. The paper is self-contained and is organized as follows: in the next section we give
some preliminary definitions and list our results. In Section 3, we first introduce some notation used throughout the
paper and then give three preliminary results that will be exploited in Section 4 to show the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria when the agents route their traffic subject to the constraints and when
these are changed. Finally we give some conclusions in Section 5. In the Appendices A–I there are parts of long proofs
of some theorems.
2. The model and our results
In this section we give some preliminary definitions, mostly following the notation of [2] and [13]. For all natural
numbers x, y, [x, y] denote the set {x, x + 1, . . . , y}, when x = 1 we simply use [y]. Consider a network N
constituted by m parallel links, each having speed s1, . . . , sm respectively, on which n agents wish to route their
indivisible traffic, of weight w1, . . . , wn , respectively. If s1 = · · · = sm , the links are said identical. In what
follows, m and n will always be the number of links and of agents in the network, respectively. A strategy Pi for
an agent i , is a probability distribution on the set of the m links: P ji , j ∈ [m], is the probability of agent i to
route her traffic on link j . In particular a pure strategy is a strategy such that P ji ∈ {0, 1} (that is agent i sends
her traffic on a unique link with probability 1) and a fully mixed strategy Pi is a strategy such that P
j
i ∈ (0, 1),
for all j ∈ [m]. A strategy matrix P = 〈P1, . . . , Pn〉 is a matrix of n column-vector strategies. The support Si
associated to a strategy Pi is a vector of indicator (binary) variables S
j
i with j ∈ [m] such that S ji = 0 if and only
if P ji = 0. A support matrix S = 〈S1, . . . , Sn〉 is a matrix of n column-vector supports. Given a strategy matrix
P = 〈P1, . . . , Pn〉, the support matrix associated to P is the matrix S = 〈S1, . . . , Sn〉 with Si associated to Pi , i
∈ [n].
Definition 1 (Agent Expected Costs). The expected cost of agent i , when she routes her traffic on link j , is c ji =
(
∑
k 6=i P
j
k wk + wi )/s j .
In this definition, we consider the traffic of the agent k 6= i weighted by the probability that she routes her traffic on
link j , while the agent i certainly routes her traffic on this link.
Our scenario is the following: a constraint Fi associated to agent i is a vector of indicator (binary) variables F
j
i
with j ∈ [m] such that F ji = 0 if and only if agent i cannot (is forbidden to) route her traffic on link j . A constraint
matrix F = 〈F1, . . . , Fn〉 is a matrix of n column-vector constraints. A support Si is compatible with a constraint Fi
if whenever F ji = 0 then S ji = 0, for j ∈ [m]. A support matrix S is compatible with a constraint matrix F if Si is
compatible with Fi , i ∈ [n].
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium). Let P be a strategy matrix, S be the support matrix associated to P and F be a
constraint matrix such that S is compatible with F . The strategy matrix P is a Nash equilibrium if
c ji ≤ cli ∀i ∈ [n], ∀ j, l ∈ [m] such that P ji > 0 and F li = 1. (1)
40 A. Ferrante, M. Parente / Theoretical Computer Science 393 (2008) 37–53
Informally speaking, a strategy matrix P is a Nash equilibrium if there is no incentive for any agent to unilaterally
modify her strategy. Thus in a Nash equilibrium the costs c ji of agent i ∈ [n] are equals on all links j ∈ [m] such that
P ji > 0.
To see that the previous definition of Nash equilibrium is different from the classical definition of Nash equilibrium
without constraints, let us consider a simple network with two identical links (s1 = s2 = 1) and two agents with
identical weights w1 = w2 = 1 and the following constraint matrix F =
[
0 0
1 1
]
. It is easy to see that the strategy
matrix P =
[
0 0
1 1
]
is a Nash equilibrium in the model with constraints F , whereas it is not a Nash equilibrium in
the classical model without constraints. The previous example also shows that if we have a Nash equilibrium P for a
network with constraints and we remove some of them, then it maybe the case that P is not a Nash equilibrium for
the network with the new set of constraints. Hence, we can now define our problem as follows.
Definition 3 (Route(N , F, S) Problem). Given a network N , a constraint matrix F and a support matrix S compatible
with F , Route(N , F, S) problem is the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium P such that S is associated to P .
A link j is an s-link if and only if there exists i ∈ [n] such that P ji > 0 and P jk = 0 for all k 6= i (in [17] this is
called a solo link). The agent i is called s-agent for the s-link j . In order to treat strategy matrices we introduce the
following measures: given a support matrix S, α is the number of agents that decide to not route their traffic on at least
one link (α j is the number of agents that decide to not route their traffic on the link j) and β is the number of links on
which at least one agent does not route her traffic. Observe that β is the number of rows of S containing at least one 0
and α is the number of columns of S containing at least one 0. Given two constraint matrices, F and H , we introduce
the following partial order relation on them: F  H if F ji ≤ H ji , for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m].
Our results. In Section 3 we consider a Route(N , F, S) problem with at least one s-link and give a necessary condition
for the existence of a Nash equilibrium relating the speed of the links to the traffic weights of the agents. This result,
specialized to the case of identical links, yields a corollary also proved in [5]. Then we give a lemma showing that,
given a Nash equilibrium associated to a support matrix on a network with identical links, if some agents are forbidden
to route their traffic on a pair of links and the others have no routing constraints on both these links, then in a Nash
equilibrium the probability of agents to route their traffic on one of these two links is equal to the probability to route
the traffic on the other link. Then we give a necessary condition on any solution of Route(N , F, S) and finally prove
that, if such a solution exists, it is unique. In Section 4 we address the following two scenarios:
(a) the case in which the constraints (link faults) are permanent: we seek for a solution of Route(N , F, S); in particular,
we investigate the case in which agents use all links they can. That is, the case in which each agent assigns non-zero
probability to every non-forbidden link. We call this problem Static-Route(N , F) and we have Static-Route(N , F)
:= Route(N , F, F);
(b) the dynamic case in which the constraints (link faults) are transient and thus one seeks for a solution to
Route(N , F, S) which remains a Nash equilibrium if some links are no longer forbidden to some agents. That is, a
solution for Static-Route(N , F) which is also a solution for Route(N , H, S) = Route(N , H, F) for any constraint
matrix H such that F  H . We call this problem Dynamic-Route(N , H, F).
For both the scenarios we investigate three classes of supports, as classified by the values of α and β. For all classes,
every agent is forbidden to route on at most one link:
(I) one forbidden link and at most (n − 2) agents are forbidden to route on that link (β = 1 and α ∈ [n − 2]);
(II) two forbidden links and at most (n − 2) agents are forbidden to route on these two links (β = 2 and
α ∈ [2, n − 2]);
(III) no two agents are forbidden to route on the same link (α = β ≤ n − 2).
For each of these three cases we show the following results:
(i) a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a solution P for Static-Route(N , F). These conditions
can be verified and P can be computed in O(mn) time.
(ii) a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a solution to Dynamic-Route(N , H, F).
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3. Notation and preliminary results
We will adopt the following notation. Given a Route(N , F, S) problem, let Z j = {i ∈ [n] | S ji = 0} be the set of
agents that do not route their traffic on link j . Note that α j = |Z j |. Then we define [Z j ] = {l ∈ [m] | Z j = Z l}, i.e.
[Z j ] is an equivalence class containing links on which the same set of agents do not route their traffic. For simplicity,
we assume in the rest of the paper, that the α constrained agents1 are the agents 1, . . . , α, and the forbidden links are
the links 1, . . . β.
Now we give three results. The first is an (effective) necessary condition for the existence of a solution to the
Route(N , F, S) problem with at least one s-link. The other two results will be used in the next section. The second
result is a technical lemma showing a necessary condition on the solution of Route(N , F, S), if it exists. In particular
we show that any solution of Route(N , F, S) is a solution of a particular system of linear equations. In the last result
we characterize four cases for which this solution is unique.
Proposition 1. Consider a Route(N , F, S) problem and a strategy matrix P associated to S. If there exists an s-agent
il for an s-link l and a link j 6= l such that S jil = 1 and
s j
sl
6=
∑
k 6=il P
j
k wk
wil
+ 1, then the strategy matrix P is not a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. From Definition 1, it results that clil = wil /sl . Recall that in a Nash equilibrium c
j
il
= clil , for all j ∈ [m] such
that P jil > 0. Thus
∑
k 6=il P
j
k wk+wil
s j
= wilsl for all j ∈ [m] such that P
j
il
> 0, so
∑
k 6=il P
j
k wk
wil
+ 1 = s jsl for all j such that
P jil > 0, which completes the proof. 
The previous proposition can be specialized to the case of identical links, yielding the following corollary (which
resembles Proposition 1 of [5]).
Corollary 1. Consider a Route(N , F, S) problem on identical links. If there exists an s-agent il for an s-link l such
that a link j 6= l and an agent k 6= il exist with S jil = S
j
k = 1, then there is no solution to the Route(N , F, S)
problem.
The following lemma establishes that, given a Route(N , F, S) problem, if j, l ∈ [m] belong to the same equivalence
class and the number of zeros on those links is at most n − 2, that in a strategy matrix P inducing a Nash equilibrium
it holds P ji = P li for all i ∈ [n]. In words, when the α j ≤ (n − 2) agents are forbidden to route their traffic on the
links j and l then, in a situation of Nash equilibrium, the remaining n−α j agents have all equal probabilities to route
their traffic on j and l.
Lemma 1. Consider a Route(N , F, S) problem on identical links and let P be a Nash equilibrium such that S is
associated to P. Given two different links l, j ∈ [m] such that [Z j ] = [Z l ], if α j ≤ n − 2 then P ji = P li for all
i ∈ [n].
Proof. By way of contradiction, let i1 ∈ [n] be an agent such that P ji1 < P li1 (the case P
j
i1
> P li1 is similar). Since
α j ≤ n− 2, then at least one agent different from i with positive probability on link j exists. Now we have two cases.
If P ji < P
l
i for all i 6= i1, then obviously
∑
k∈[n]\{i1} P
j
k wk <
∑
k∈[n]\{i1} P
l
kwk and, therefore, c
j
i1
< cli1 , that is a
contradiction since P is a Nash equilibrium. On the other side, let i2 6= i1 such that P ji2 ≥ P li2 . Since P is a Nash
equilibrium, we have
∑
k∈[n]\{i1} P
j
k wk =
∑
k∈[n]\{i1} P
l
kwk , thus
∑
k∈[n]\{i1,i2} P
j
k wk ≤
∑
k∈[n]\{i1,i2} P
l
kwk and since
P ji1 < P
l
i1
then c ji2 < c
l
i2
which is the desired contradiction. 
From this lemma, we can show how to reduce the computation of a solution for a Route(N , F, S) problem to the
computation of a solution of a system of linear equations. Assume w.l.o.g. that if there are v different equivalence
classes, then [Z1] 6= [Z2] 6= · · · 6= [Zv], that is the first v links are all in different equivalence classes. Let
Mi = max{ j ∈ [v] | S ji = 1}. Consider the following system of linear equations:
1 An agent which is forbidden to route her traffic on a link is called constrained.
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cMii = cli ∀ i ∈ [n], l ∈ [v]\{Mi } s.t. Sli = 1
P li = P ji ∀ j ∈ [v], l ∈ [Z j ]\{ j}, i ∈ [n]\Z l∑
j∈[m], S ji =1
P ji = 1 ∀ i ∈ [n].
(2)
Theorem 1. Let us consider a Route(N , F, S) problem on identical links such that α j ≤ n − 2 for all j ∈ [m]. If the
Route(N , F, S) problem admits a solution Q, then Q is solution of the system (2).
Proof. Since Q is a Nash equilibrium with S associated to Q,2 the costs for an agent i are constant on all links j
where S ji = 1, therefore the first set of equations is trivially satisfied (recall that SMii = 1 from the definition of Mi ).
Since α j ≤ n− 2 for all j ∈ [m], from Lemma 1 the probabilities for an agent i in a Nash equilibrium are constant on
all the links in the same class of equivalence, therefore the second set of equations is satisfied as well. Finally, since
Q ji = 0 whenever S ji = 0 and Qi is a probability distribution (from the definition of Nash equilibrium), then also the
third set of equations is satisfied, therefore Q is a solution of system (2). 
We now characterize four cases for which the system (2) admits exactly one solution. Since from now on we
examine the case in which every agent has at most one forbidden link, we can assume without loss of generality, that
the first α1 agents are forbidden to route on link 1, the second α2 on link 2 , and so on. That is, the agents forbidden
to route on the link j are the agents in the set Z j = {(∑ j−1l=1 αl) + 1, . . . , (∑ j−1l=1 αl) + α j }. Moreover, for an agent
i ∈ [α], let z(i) be the unique link j such that S ji = 0 and z(i) = 0 if this link does not exist.
Theorem 2. Consider a Route(N , F, S) problem such that each agent has at most one indicator variable equal to
zero in its support. If one of the following conditions hold, then system (2) admits exactly one solution.
• CASE A: β = 1 and α ∈ [n − 2];
• CASE B: β = 2 and α ∈ [2, n − 2];
• CASE C: β = α, α ∈ [n − 2] and β < m;
• CASE D: β = α, α ∈ [2, n − 2] and β = m.
Proof. The proofs for cases B, C and D are quite similar, therefore we will show here only proofs for cases A and B
and move the other two proofs to Appendix A. Consider system (2): in the cases A, B and C we have that v = β + 1
and Mi = β + 1 for all i ∈ [n]. Moreover we have that [Z j ] = { j} for all j ∈ [β] and that [Zβ+1] = [β + 1,m].
Therefore, from the first equation of system (2) we have that in these cases [v]\{Mi } = [β]. Moreover, since for a set
of links L and an agent i it holds that {l ∈ L | Sli = 1} = L\{l ∈ L | Sli = 0}, in the system (2) we have that (l ∈ [β]
s.t. Sli = 1) can be written as (l ∈ [β]\{z(i)}) and ( j ∈ [m] s.t. S ji = 1) can be written as ( j ∈ [m]\{z(i)}). Therefore,
the system (2) can be written in the following way:
cβ+1i = cli ∀ i ∈ [n], and l ∈ [β]\{z(i)}
P li = Pβ+1i ∀ l ∈ [β + 2,m], i ∈ [n]∑
j∈[m]\{z(i)}
P ji = 1 ∀ i ∈ [n].
(3)
Now solutions P li , i ∈ [n] and l ∈ [β + 1]\{z(i)}, of system (3) (that is a system of (mn − α) equations in (mn − α)
unknowns) are also solutions of the following system of (n(β + 1)− α) equations in (n(β + 1)− α) unknowns.c
β+1
i − cli = 0 ∀ i ∈ [n], and l ∈ [β]\{z(i)}∑
j∈[β]\{z(i)}
P ji + (m − β)Pβ+1i = 1 ∀ i ∈ [n]. (4)
Therefore, in the proofs of cases A, B and C we will refer to system (4).
2 In the rest of the paper, we will omit the sentence “such that S is associated to P” whenever we consider Nash equilibria P as solutions of
Route(N , F, S) problems.
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In case D, instead, we have v = β equivalence classes on the links, and Mi = β for all i ∈ [n]\{α} and Mα = β−1.
Moreover we have that [Z j ] = { j} for all j ∈ [β]. Let us note that z(i) = i for i ∈ [α] and z(i) = 0 for i ∈ [α+1, n].
Therefore the system (2) can be written in the following way:

cαi = cli ∀ i ∈ [n]\{α}, and l ∈ [α − 1]\{z(i)}
cα−1α = cli ∀ l ∈ [α − 2]∑
j∈[α]\{z(i)}
P ji = 1 ∀ i ∈ [n]
(5)
and in the proof of case D we will refer to system (5). Let us proceed proving our theorem in the four cases.
CASE A (β = 1 and α ∈ [n − 2]): We first show that in this case system (4) admits at most one solution. By way
of contradiction, let Q and Qˆ be two distinct solutions. First let us note that, since Q and Qˆ are both solutions of
system (4) and [β] = {1} = {z(i)} for all i ∈ [α], then from the second set of equations of the system, we have
Q2i = Qˆ2i = 1/(m − 1) for all i ∈ [α]. Then, let us consider an agent x ∈ [α+ 1, n] with different values in Q and Qˆ
and let us suppose w.l.o.g. that Q1x < Qˆ
1
x . This implies that Q
2
x > Qˆ
2
x . From the first set of equations of system (4)
we have that
∑
k∈[α]
wkQ
2
k +
∑
k∈[α+1,n]\{i}
wkQ
2
k −
∑
k∈[α+1,n]\{i}
wkQ
1
k = 0 ∀ i ∈ [α + 1, n]∑
k∈[α]
wk Qˆ
2
k +
∑
k∈[α+1,n]\{i}
wk Qˆ
2
k −
∑
k∈[α+1,n]\{i}
wk Qˆ
1
k = 0 ∀ i ∈ [α + 1, n].
From this, since Q2k = Qˆ2k for all k ∈ [α], we have that∑
k∈[α+1,n]\{i}
wk(Q
2
k − Qˆ2k)−
∑
k∈[α+1,n]\{i}
wk(Q
1
k − Qˆ1k) = 0 ∀ i ∈ [α + 1, n]
from which, by summing up on all i ∈ [α + 1, n], we have
∑
k∈[α+1,n]
wk(Q
2
k − Qˆ2k)−
∑
k∈[α+1,n]
wk(Q
1
k − Qˆ1k) = 0.
From the last two equations we easily have (Q1x − Qˆ1x ) = (Q2x − Qˆ2x ), that is a contradiction. Therefore system (4)
admits at most one solution. Since in Appendix B it is shown that in this case system (2) admits at least one solution,
we have that in this case system (2) admits exactly one solution.
CASE B (β = 2 and α ∈ [2, n − 2]): For m = 2 the proof is similar to the one for case A, therefore we move it into
the Appendix A. Let m > 2. To show that system (4) admits exactly one solution, we will show that the equations of
the system are linearly independent. IfM is the matrix of the coefficients of system (4), then it is sufficient to show
that the rows ofM are linearly independent. Let us denote by Ai , i ∈ [n] the row ofM corresponding to the equation
P1i + P2i + (m − 2)P3i = 1, by Bi , i ∈ [α1 + 1, n] the row ofM corresponding to the equation c3i = c1i , and by Di ,
i ∈ [n]\[α1 + 1, α] the row ofM corresponding to the equation c3i = c2i . Let ai with i ∈ [n], bi with i ∈ [α1 + 1, n],
and di with i ∈ [n]\[α1 + 1, α] be real numbers such that∑
k∈[n]
ak Ak +
∑
k∈[α1+1,n]
bkBk +
∑
k∈[n]\[α1+1,α]
dkDk = 0. (6)
Obviously, necessary condition on the rows of matrixM to be linearly dependent, is that at least one of these reals is
not equal to zero. We will show that they are all equal to zero.
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Let us consider the columns corresponding to the unknowns P ji with j ∈ [3] and i ∈ [α + 1, n]. These columns
contain the following values:
β = 2, α ∈ [2, n − 2], i ∈ [α + 1, n]
P1i P
2
i P
3
i
A1 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
Aα 0 0 0
Aα+1 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
Ai−1 0 0 0
Ai 1 1 m − 2
Ai+1 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
An 0 0 0
P1i P
2
i P
3
i
Bα1+1 −wi 0 wi
...
...
...
...
Bα −wi 0 wi
Bα+1 −wi 0 wi
...
...
...
...
Bi−1 −wi 0 wi
Bi 0 0 0
Bi+1 −wi 0 wi
...
...
...
...
Bn −wi 0 wi
P1i P
2
i P
3
i
D1 0 −wi wi
...
...
...
...
Dα1 0 −wi wi
Dα+1 0 −wi wi
...
...
...
...
Di−1 0 −wi wi
Di 0 0 0
Di+1 0 −wi wi
...
...
...
...
Dn 0 −wi wi
therefore, from relation (6) we have that:
∑
k∈[α1+1,n]\{i}
wibk +
∑
k∈[n]\([α1+1,α]∪{i})
widk + (m − 2)ai = 0∑
k∈[α1+1,n]\{i}
−wibk + ai = 0∑
k∈[n]\([α1+1,α]∪{i})
−widk + ai = 0
from which summing up we have that ai = 0 for all i ∈ [α + 1, n]. From this we have
{
bi = bˆ for all i ∈ [α + 1, n]
di = dˆ for all i ∈ [α + 1, n] where

bˆ =
∑
k∈[α1+1,n]
bk
dˆ =
∑
k∈[n]\[α1+1,α]
dk .
(7)
Let us now consider the columns corresponding to unknowns P ji with i ∈ [α]. These columns contain the following
values:
β = 2, α ∈ [2, n − 2], i ∈ [α]
for all i ∈ [α1] for all i ∈ [α1 + 1, α]
P2i P
3
i
A1 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Ai−1 0 0
Ai 1 m − 2
Ai+1 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
An 0 0
P2i P
3
i
B
α1+1 0 wi
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Bα 0 wi
Bα+1 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Bn 0 wi
P2i P
3
i
D1 −wi wi
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Di−1 −wi wi
Di 0 0
Di+1 −wi wi
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
D
α1 −wi wi
Dα+1 −wi wi
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Dn −wi wi
P1i P
3
i
A1 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Ai−1 0 0
Ai 1 m − 2
Ai+1 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
An 0 0
P1i P
3
i
B
α1+1 −wi wi
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Bi−1 −wi wi
Bi 0 0
Bi+1 −wi wi
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Bα −wi wi
Bα+1 −wi wi
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Bn −wi wi
P1i P
3
i
D1 0 wi
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
D
α1 0 wi
Dα+1 0 wi
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Dn 0 wi
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therefore from the relation (6) for an agent i1 ∈ [α1] and an agent i2 ∈ [α1 + 1, α] we have that:

∑
k∈[α1+1,n]
wi1bk +
∑
k∈[n]\([α1+1,α]∪{i1}
wi1dk + (m − 2)ai1 = 0∑
k∈[n]\([α1+1,α]∪{i1})
−wi1dk + ai1 = 0
∑
k∈[α1+1,n]\{i2}
wi2bk +
∑
k∈[n]\[α1+1,α]
wi2dk + (m − 2)ai2 = 0∑
k∈[α1+1,n]\{i2}
−wi2bk + ai2 = 0
from which
∑
k∈[α1+1,n]
bk = −(m − 1) ai1
wi1∑
k∈[n]\[α1+1,α]
dk = −(m − 1) ai2
wi2
⇒
{
ai
wi
= − 1m−1 bˆ ∀ i ∈ [α1]
ai
wi
= − 1m−1 dˆ ∀ i ∈ [α1 + 1, α].
(8)
Moreover, by using (8) we obtain
∑
k∈[n]\[α1+1,n]
dk − di1 = −
1
m − 1 bˆ∑
k∈[α1+1,n]
bk − bi2 = −
1
m − 1 dˆ
⇒
{
di = dˆ + 1m−1 bˆ ∀ i ∈ [α1]
bi = bˆ + 1m−1 dˆ ∀ i ∈ [α1 + 1, α].
(9)
Then, by considering the column corresponding to the unknown P jα+1 with j ∈ [2] and by using formulae (9) and (7)
we obtain thatα
1
(
dˆ + 1m−1 bˆ
)
+ (n − α − 1)dˆ = 0
α2
(
bˆ + 1m−1 dˆ
)
+ (n − α − 1)bˆ = 0
⇒
{
bˆ = 0
dˆ = 0
from which, by substituting in formulae (7)–(9) and by recalling that ai = 0 for all i ∈ [α], we obtain that ai = 0 for
all i ∈ [n], bi = 0 for all i ∈ [α1 + 1, n] and di = 0 for all i ∈ [n]\[α1 + 1, α], that completes the proof for this
case. 
4. Nash equilibria on networks with identical links
In this section we will establish effective necessary and sufficient conditions on the existence of a solution to some
Route(N , F, S) problems with at most one forbidden link per agent. From Theorem 1 and from the definition of
Route(N , F, S) a necessary condition is that the system (2) has all solutions in (0, 1]. Moreover we also consider
the case in which some or all constraints are removed (a Route(N , H, S) problem with F  H ) and we show
necessary and sufficient conditions to establish when the solution to Route(N , F, S) problem is also a solution for
the Route(N , H, S) problem. In the following proofs, we use solutions of the system (2) which have been calculated
using the software Matlab c© to find the base cases and then by guessing the solution for the other cases. To give
readable proofs, we moved most of the arithmetics (e.g. the verification of the solutions of the system (2)) to the
Appendices A–I.
Let us remark that our solutions are also time efficient. Indeed to establish whether a Nash equilibrium exists
takes O(βn) time, see Theorems 3, 5, 7 and 9. In case it exists, the computation of the probabilities takes O(mn)
time. Moreover, to establish whether the equilibrium still holds when the constraints are relaxed takes O(n) time, see
Theorems 4, 6, 8 and 10.
In the rest of the paper we will use the following notation. For a set of agents X , we will usewXmin = min{wi | i ∈ X}
and wXmax = max{wi | i ∈ X} to denote, respectively, the minimum and the maximum weight of the agents in X and
WX =∑k∈X wk to denote the sum of the weights of the agents in the set X . Finally, given two constraint matrices F
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and H , such that F  H , we will use R(F, H, l) = {i ∈ [n] | F li = 0 and H li = 1} with l ∈ [m], to denote the set of
the agents for which the constraint on the link l has been relaxed and we will use R(F, H) =⋃l∈[m] R(F, H, l).
4.1. Problems with one forbidden link and at most n − 2 constrained agents
In this subsection we consider at most (n − 2) agents which are all forbidden to route the traffic on the first link.
In the following theorem we give a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the solution for Static-
Route(N , F).
Theorem 3. Let β = 1 and α ∈ [n − 2]. A solution to Static-Route(N , F) exists if and only if
W[α] < (m − 1)[n − (α + 1)]w[α+1,n]min . (10)
In this case the Nash probabilities are
P li =

0 i ∈ [α] and l = 1
1
m−1 i ∈ [α] and l ∈ [2,m]
1
m
(
1+ W[α]
(n−(α+1))wi
)
i ∈ [α + 1, n] and l = 1
1
m
(
1− W[α]
(m−1)(n−(α+1))wi
)
= 1−P1im−1 i ∈ [α + 1, n] and l ∈ [2,m].
(11)
Proof. In the Appendix B, it is verified that if β = 1 and α ∈ [n − 2] then (11) is a solution of system (2) and thus
from Theorem 2 this is unique. Hence from Theorem 1, we have that if Route(N , F, S) problem has a solution Q, then
Q is equal to (11) and, from the definition of Route(N , F, S) problem, (11) is a Nash equilibrium. On the other side,
from the definition of Route(N , F, S) problem, it is obvious that if (11) is a Nash equilibrium, then it is a solution to
the Route(N , F, S) problem. Therefore, to prove our theorem, we have only to show that (11) is a Nash equilibrium
iff condition (10) holds.
(Only if) If (11) is a Nash equilibrium, then by definition it is a strategy matrix, that is: P1i ∈ (0, 1) for i ∈ [α+1, n].
Hence, from the third item of formula (11) we have:
−[n − (α + 1)]wi < W[α] < (m − 1)[n − (α + 1)]wi
for all i ∈ [α + 1, n], therefore condition (10) holds.
(If) If condition (10) holds, then 0 < W[α] < (m − 1)[n − (α + 1)]wi for all i ∈ [α + 1, n], that is
0 <
[n − (α + 1)]wi +W[α]
m[n − (α + 1)]wi < 1,
therefore, from formula (11), P1i ∈ (0, 1) holds. From formula (11) we have that P li = 1−P
1
i
m−1 for all i ∈ [α+ 1, n] and
l ∈ [2,m], therefore P li ∈ (0, 1). Obviously P l1 ∈ (0, 1] for l ∈ [2,m]. Then, since P is solution of (2), it is a strategy
matrix.
Moreover, from the first and the second set of equations of the system (2), it holds that c ji = cli for all i ∈ [n] and
j, l ∈ [m], such that S ji = Sli = 1. Therefore, since F = S, formula (11) is a Nash equilibrium. 
Now we show a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the solution to theDynamic-Route(N , H, F)
problem.
Theorem 4. Let β = 1, α ∈ [n − 2], H be a constraint matrix such that F  H and P be a strategy matrix. Then P
is a solution for Static-Route(N , F) problem if and only if P is a solution for Dynamic-Route(N , H, F) problem.
Proof. Let H be a constraint matrix such that F  H .
(Only if) From Theorem 3, let the support matrix P have the values given by (11).
Note that since F  H nothing is changed for the agent i 6∈ R(F, H). Therefore, let us focus on an agent
i ∈ R(F, H) for which the constraint is removed, that is F1i = 0 and H1i = 1.
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For such an agent, from (11), the costs on the links in the Route(N , H, F) problem are:
c1i =
1
m
∑
k>α
wk + (n − α + mn − αm − m)wim[n − (α + 1)] +
(n − α)
∑
k≤α,k 6=i
wk
m[n − (α + 1)]
and
cli =
1
m
∑
k>α
wk +
{m[n − (α + 1)] − n + α}
∑
k≤α,k 6=i
wk
m(m − 1)[n − (α + 1)] +
{m(m − 1)[n − (α + 1)] − n + α}wi
m(m − 1)[n − (α + 1)]
for l ∈ [2,m], from which cli − c1i = −
∑
k≤α,k 6=i wk+(n−α)wi
(m−1)[n−(α+1)] < 0 for all l ∈ [2,m] (see Appendix C). Hence the cost
for agent i to route on the first link (which is no longer forbidden to it) is greater than the cost on the other links,
therefore the strategy matrix P yields a Nash equilibrium for the Route(N , H, S) problem.
(If) Since F  H , it is obvious that if P is a solution for the Route(N , H, F) problem, then it is a solution for the
Route(N , F, F) problem. 
4.2. Problems with two forbidden links and at most n − 2 constrained agents
Here we consider the case in which there are α ≤ n − 2 agents with at most one forbidden link and a total
of two forbidden links. Let us recall that, for an agent i ∈ [α], z(i) is the link such that Sz(i)i = 0, and that
Z l = {i ∈ [n] | Sli = 0} is the set of the agents with zero probability on the link l. For the sake of clarity let us
define the following values:
A = [m(m − 1)2(n − α)2 + m(m − 1)2(n − α)(α − 2)+ m2(m − 2)α1α2
−m(m − 1)2α + m(m − 1)2]
Bl = m(m − 1)(m − 2)αl C = m(m − 1)(m − 2)(n − α − 1)
D = m−1m A E = (m − 1)3(n − 1)
F l = Blm−1 Gl = C + Bl
Hl = Em−1 − B
l
m−1 .
Theorem 5. Let β = 2 and α ∈ [2, n − 2]. A solution for Static-Route(N , F) exists if and only if
0 <
Awi−F lWZz(i)+GlWZ3−z(i)
mDwi < 1−  ∀ i ∈ [α], l = 3− z(i)
0 <
Dwi+(E−B3−l )WZl− Em−1WZ3−l
mDwi < 1 ∀ i ∈ [α + 1, n], l ∈ [2]
0 <
2Dwi+ (m−2)Em−1 W[α]−(B2WZ1+B1WZ2 )
mDwi < 1−  ∀ i ∈ [α + 1, n]
(12)
where  = 0 if m = 2 and  ∈ R+ if m > 2. In this case the Nash probabilities are:
P li =

Awi−F lWZz(i)+GlWZ3−z(i)
mDwi i ∈ [α], l = 3− z(i)
Awi+F3−z(i)(m−2) WZz(i)−G
3−z(i)
m−2 WZ3−z(i)
mDwi i ∈ [α], l ∈ [3,m]
Dwi+(E−B3−l )WZl− Em−1WZ3−l
mDwi i ∈ [α + 1, n], l ∈ [2]
Dwi−H2WZ1−H1WZ2
mDwi i ∈ [α + 1, n], l ∈ [3,m].
(13)
Proof. In the Appendix D, it is verified that if β = 2 and α ∈ [2, n − 2] then (13) is a solution of system (2) and thus
from Theorem 2 this is unique. Hence from Theorem 1, we have that if Route(N , F, S) problem has a solution Q, then
Q is equal to (13) and, from the definition of Route(N , F, S) problem, (13) is a Nash equilibrium. On the other side,
from the definition of Route(N , F, S) problem, it is obvious that if (13) is a Nash equilibrium, then it is a solution to
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Fig. 1. The matrices F = S, P and H used in the Example 1.
the Route(N , F, S) problem. Therefore, to prove our theorem, we have only to show that (13) is a Nash equilibrium
iff condition (12) holds.
(Only if) If (13) is a Nash equilibrium, then by definition it is a strategy matrix. Therefore for all i ∈ [α],
P3−z(i)i = 1 if m = 2 and 0 < P3−z(i)i < 1 if m > 2, that is, from the second item of (13), the first item of (12) holds.
Moreover, since m ≥ 2 then 0 < P li < 1 for all i ∈ [α + 1, n] and l ∈ [1, 2], that is, from the third item of (13),
the second item of (12) holds.
Finally, since P is a strategy matrix, then for all i ∈ [α+1, n] it holds P1i + P2i = 1 ifm = 2 and 0 < P1i + P2i < 1
otherwise. That is, since from the third item of (13) we have (note that G1 = G2)
P1i + P2i =
Dwi + (E − B2)WZ1 − Em−1WZ2
mDwi +
Dwi + (E − B1)WZ2 − Em−1WZ1
mDwi
= 2Dwi +
(m−2)E
m−1 W[α] − (B2WZ1 + B1WZ2)
mDwi
for all i ∈ [α + 1, n], then the third item of (12) holds.
(If) If the first item of condition (12) holds, then, from the second item of (13), for all i ∈ [α] it holds that
0 < P3−z(i)i ≤ 1 if m = 2 and 0 < P3−z(i)i < 1 if m > 2. Using the same argument, if the second item of
condition (12) holds, then, from the third item of (13), 0 < P li < 1 for all i ∈ [α+ 1, n] and l = 1, 2. Since (13) is the
solution of the system (2), then P li = 1−P
1
i −P2i
m−2 for all i ∈ [n] and l ∈ [2,m], therefore, from the third item of (12),
0 < P li < 1. Then P is a strategy matrix.
Since formula (13) is the solution of the system (2) as well, it holds that c ji = cli for all i ∈ [n] and j, l ∈ [m], such
that S ji = Sli = 1. Therefore, since F = S, formula (13)) is a Nash equilibrium. 
In the following example we show that in general Dynamic-Route(N , H, F) problem, F  H , has not always a
solution.
Example 1. Consider the Static-Route(N , F) problem where m = 2, n = 6 and w1 = w2 = 1, w3 = w4 = 5
and w5 = w6 = 10 and F is the constraint matrix shown in Fig. 1. From Theorem 5, the solution of this problem
is the strategy matrix P . Let us consider the Dynamic-Route(N , H, F) problem with the constraint matrix H shown
in Fig. 1. It is easy to see that P is not a solution for the Dynamic-Route(N , H, F) problem since c11 = 13 and
c21 = 20. 
In the next theorem we show a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the solution for the Dynamic-
Route(N , H, F) problem. For the sake of clarity, we introduce the following notations:
I = (m − 3)(n − 1) J l = (m(n − αl − 1)(m − 2)− (n − 1)).
Theorem 6. Let β = 2 and α ∈ [2, n−2]. Let H be a constraint matrix such that F  H and P be a strategy matrix.
Then P is a solution for Static-Route(N , F) and for all l ∈ [2] the inequality (14) holds if and only if P is a solution
for Dynamic-Route(N , H, F).
IWZ3−l − J 3−lWZ l ≤
A
m
w
R(F,H,l)
min . (14)
Proof. Let H be a constraint matrix such that F  H .
(Only if) From Theorem 5, let the support matrix P have the values given by (13).
Note that since F  H nothing is changed from an agent i 6∈ R(F, H) viewpoint. Therefore, let us focus on an
agent i ∈ R(F, H) for which the constraint is removed.
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For such an agent, from (13), the costs on the links in the Route(N , H, F) problem are such that (see Appendix E)
cz(i)i − c3−z(i)i =
IWZ3−z(i) − J 3−lWZ z(i)
D −
A
mDwi (15)
and since the inequality (14) holds then cz(i)i − c3−z(i)i ≤ 0. Hence the cost for agent i on the no longer forbidden
link is no lower than the cost on the other links, therefore the strategy matrix P yields a Nash equilibrium for the
Route(N , H, S) problem.
(If) Since F  H , it is obvious that if P is a solution for the Route(N , H, F) problem, then it is a solution for the
Route(N , F, F) problem. Then, from Theorem 5, P has the values given by (13). Moreover, since P is the solution of
Route(N , H, F) then cz(i)i − c3−z(i)i ≤ 0 for all i ∈ R(F, H), that is from (15) the inequality (14) holds. 
4.3. Problems with m forbidden links and m constrained agents
This third subsection is devoted to the case in which the α agents are all forbidden to route on different links and
α = m.
Theorem 7. Let n − 2 ≥ β = α = m ≥ 2. A solution for Static-Route(N , F) exists if and only if:{
0 < 1m−1 + (m−2)wl−W[m]\{i,l}(m−1)[(m−1)n−(2m−1)]wi < 1−  ∀ i ∈ [m], l ∈ [m]\{i}
0 < 1m + (m−1)wl−W[m]\{l}m[(m−1)n−(2m−1)]wi < 1 ∀ i ∈ [m + 1, n], l ∈ [m]
(16)
where  = 0 if m = 2 and  ∈ R+ if m > 2. In this case the Nash probabilities are:
P li =

0 i ∈ [m] and l = i
1
m−1
(
1+ (m−2)wl−W[m]\{i,l}[(m−1)n−(2m−1)]wi
)
i ∈ [m] and l ∈ [m]\{i}
1
m
(
1+ (m−1)wl−W[m]\{l}[(m−1)n−(2m−1)]wi
)
i ∈ [m + 1, n] and l ∈ [m].
(17)
Proof. In the Appendix F, it is verified that if α = β = m and α ∈ [2, n − 2] then (17) is a solution of system (2) and
thus from Theorem 2 this is unique. Hence from Theorem 1, we have that if Route(N , F, S) problem has a solution
Q, then Q is equal to (17) and, from the definition of Route(N , F, S) problem, (17) is a Nash equilibrium. On the
other side, from the definition of Route(N , F, S) problem, it is obvious that if (17) is a Nash equilibrium, then it is a
solution to the Route(N , F, S) problem. Therefore, to prove our theorem, we have only to show that (17) is a Nash
equilibrium iff condition (16) holds.
(Only if) If (17) is a Nash equilibrium, then by definition it is a strategy matrix. Therefore for all i ∈ [m], P3−ii = 1
if m = 2 and 0 < P li < 1 for all l ∈ [m]\{i} if m > 2, that is, from the second item of (17), the first item of (16)
holds.
Moreover, since m ≥ 2 then 0 < P li < 1 for all i ∈ [m + 1, n] and l ∈ [m], that is, from the third item of (17), the
second item of (16) holds.
(If) If the first item of condition (16) holds, then, from second item of (17), for all i ∈ [m] it holds that
0 < P3−ii ≤ 1 if m = 2 and 0 < P li < 1 for all l ∈ [m]\{i} if m > 2. Using similar arguments, if the second
item of condition (16) holds, then from third item of (17), 0 < P li < 1 for all i ∈ [m + 1, n] and l ∈ [m]. Then P is a
strategy matrix.
Since formula (17) is the solution of the system (2) as well, it holds that c ji = cli for all i ∈ [n] and j, l ∈ [m], such
that S ji = Sli = 1. Therefore, since F = S, formula (17) is a Nash equilibrium. 
Here we give an example of aDynamic-Route(N , H, F) problem, F  H , that has no solution in the case examined
in Theorem 8.
Example 2. Consider the Static-Route(N , F) problem where N has m = 2 links and n = 4 agents with weights
w1 = 1, w2 = 5 and w3 = w4 = 10 and F is the constraint matrix shown in Fig. 2. From Theorem 7, the solution of
this problem is the strategy matrix P shown in Fig. 2.
Let us consider the Dynamic-Route(N , H, F) problem with the constraint matrix H shown in Fig. 2. It is easy to
see that P is not a solution for the Dynamic-Route(N , H, F) problem since c11 = 12 and c21 = 15. 
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Fig. 2. The matrices F = S, P and H used in the Example 2.
Now we will use Theorem 7 to show a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a solution to the
Dynamic-Route(N , H, F) problem.
Theorem 8. Let n − 2 ≥ β = α = m ≥ 2. Let H be a constraint matrix such that F  H and P be a strategy
matrix. Then P is a solution for Static-Route(N , F) and the inequality (18) holds if and only if P is a solution for
Dynamic-Route(N , H, F).
W[m] < [(m − 1)n − (m − 1)]wR(F,H)min . (18)
Proof. Let H be a constraint matrix such that F  H .
(Only if) From Theorem 7, let the support matrix P have the values given by (17).
Note that since F  H nothing is changed from an agent i 6∈ R(F, H) viewpoint. Therefore, let us focus on an
agent i ∈ R(F, H) for which the constraint is removed.
For such an agent, from (17), the costs on the links in the Route(N , H, F) problem are
cii =
∑
k>m
[(m − 1)n − (2m − 1)]wk + (m − 1)wi −
∑
s≤m,s 6=i
ws
m[(m − 1)n − (2m − 1)] + wi
+
∑
k≤m,k 6=i
[(m − 1)n − (2m − 1)]wk + (m − 2)wi −
∑
s≤m,s 6=k,i
ws
(m − 1)[(m − 1)n − (2m − 1)]
cli =
∑
k>m
[(m − 1)n − (2m − 1)]wk + (m − 1)wl −
∑
s≤m,s 6=l
ws
m[(m − 1)n − (2m − 1)] + wi
+
∑
k≤m,k 6=i,l
[(m − 1)n − (2m − 1)]wk + (m − 2)wl −
∑
s≤m,s 6=k,l
ws
(m − 1)[(m − 1)n − (2m − 1)]
from which (see Appendix G)
cli − cii = −
[(m − 1)n − m]wi −W[m]
(m − 1)[(m − 1)n − (2m − 1)] (19)
and since the inequality (18) holds then cli − cii ≤ 0. Hence the cost for agent i on the no longer forbidden link is no
lower than the cost on the other links, therefore the strategy matrix P yields a Nash equilibrium for the Route(N , H, S)
problem.
(If) Since F  H , it is obvious that if P is a solution for the Route(N , H, F) problem, then it is a solution for the
Route(N , F, F) problem. Then, from Theorem 7, P has the values given by (17). Moreover, since P is the solution of
Route(N , H, F) then cli − cii ≤ 0 for all i ∈ R(F, H) and l ∈ [m]\{i}, that is from (19) the inequality (18) holds. 
4.4. Problems with β < m forbidden links and β constrained agents
This subsection completes the examination of the case α = β, focusing on when α < m. For the sake of clarity, let
us define the following constants:
A = n − 2 B = (m − 1)n − (2m − β) C = (m − 2)n − (2m − (β + 2))
D = n − 1 E = (m − 1)n − (2m − 1) F = (m − 1)n − (2m − (β + 1)).
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Fig. 3. The matrices F = S, P and H used in the Example 3. The missing columns are all respectively equals to the fourth column.
Theorem 9. Let n − 2 ≥ β = α ≥ 2 and β < m. A solution for Static-Route(N , F) exists if and only if
0 < (AB−1)wi+Cwl−DW[β]−{k,l}EFwi < 1 ∀ i ∈ [β], l ∈ [β]\{i}
0 < ABwi−AW[β]\{i}EFwi < 1 ∀ i ∈ [β]
0 < EFwi+[(m−1)B+(β−1)]wl−(m−1)DW[β]\{l}mEFwi < 1 ∀ i ∈ [β + 1, n], l ∈ [β]
0 < Fwi−W[β]mFwi < 1 ∀ i ∈ [β + 1, n].
(20)
In this case the Nash probabilities are:
P li =

0 i ∈ [β], l = i
(AB−1)wi+Cwl−DW[β]\{i,l}
EFwi i ∈ [β], l ∈ [β]\{i}ABwi−AW[β]\{i}
EFwi i ∈ [β], l ∈ [β + 1,m]EFwi+[(m−1)B+(β−1)]wl−(m−1)DW[β]\{l}
mEFwi i ∈ [β + 1, n], l ∈ [β]Fwi−W[β]
mFwi i ∈ [β + 1, n], l ∈ [β + 1,m].
(21)
Proof. In the Appendix H, it is verified that if β = 1 and α ∈ [n − 2] then (21) is a solution of system (2) and thus
from Theorem 2 this is unique. Hence from Theorem 1, we have that if Route(N , F, S) problem has a solution Q, then
Q is equal to (21) and, from the definition of Route(N , F, S) problem, (21) is a Nash equilibrium. On the other side,
from the definition of Route(N , F, S) problem, it is obvious that if (21) is a Nash equilibrium, then it is a solution to
the Route(N , F, S) problem. Therefore, to prove our theorem, we have only to show that (21) is a Nash equilibrium
iff condition (20) holds.
(Only if) If (21) is a Nash equilibrium, then by definition it is a strategy matrix. Therefore, sincem ≥ 3, 0 < P li < 1
for all i ∈ [β] and l ∈ [β + 1]\{i}, that is, from items 2 and 3 of (21), the items 1 and 2 of (20) hold.
Using the same argument we have 0 < P li < 1 for all i ∈ [m+ 1, n] and l ∈ [β + 1] that is, from the items 4 and 5
of (21), the items 3 and 4 of (20) hold.
(If) If the first item of condition (20) holds, then, from the second item of formula (21), it holds that 0 < P li < 1
for all i ∈ [β] and l ∈ [β]\{i}. If the second item of condition (20) holds, then, from the third item of formula (21), it
holds that 0 < P li < 1 for all i ∈ [β] and l ∈ [β + 1,m].
Using similar arguments we have that if the items 3 and 4 of condition (20) hold, then from items 4 and 5 of
formula (21), it holds that 0 < P li < 1 for all i ∈ [β + 1, n] and l ∈ [m]. Then P is a strategy matrix.
Since formula (21) is the solution of the system (2) as well, it holds that c ji = cli for all i ∈ [n] and j, l ∈ [m], such
that S ji = Sli = 1. Therefore, since F = S, formula (21) is a Nash equilibrium. 
Here we give an example of aDynamic-Route(N , H, F) problem, F  H , that has no solution in the case examined
in Theorem 10.
Example 3. Consider the Static-Route(N , F) problem where N has m = 4 links and n = 7 agents with weights
w1 = 1, w2 = w3 = 7 and w4 = w5 = w6 = w7 = 1 and F is the constraint matrix shown in Fig. 3. From
Theorem 9, the solution of this problem is the strategy matrix P shown in Fig. 3.
Let us consider the Dynamic-Route(N , H, F) problem with the constraint matrix H shown in Fig. 3. It is easy to
see that P is not a solution for the Dynamic-Route(N , H, F) problem since c11 = 30 2416664 and c21 = 36 5686664 . 
Now we show a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the solution to theDynamic-Route(N , H, F)
problem.
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Fig. 4. The classification of the supports. The checked entries are the cases considered in the paper.
Theorem 10. Let n−2 ≥ β = α ≥ 2 and β < m. Let H be a constraint matrix such that F  H and P be a strategy
matrix. Then P is a solution for Static-Route(N , F) and the inequality (22) holds if and only if P is a solution for
Dynamic-Route(N , H, F).
W[β] ≤ [(m − 1)n − (2m − (β + 1))]wR(F,H)min . (22)
Proof. Let H be a constraint matrix such that F  H .
(Only if) From Theorem 9, let the support matrix P have the values given by (21).
Note that since F  H nothing is changed from an agent i 6∈ R(F, H) viewpoint. Therefore, let us focus on an
agent i ∈ R(F, H) for which the constraint is removed.
For such an agent, from (21), the costs on the links in the Route(N , H, F) problem are such that (see Appendix I)
cli − cii =
n − 1
EF W[β] −
(n − 1)[(m − 1)n − (2m − (β + 1))]
EF wi (23)
and since the inequality (22) holds then cli − cii ≤ 0. Hence the cost for agent i on the no longer forbidden link is no
lower than the cost on the other links, therefore the strategy matrix P yields a Nash equilibrium for the Route(N , H, S)
problem.
(If) Since F  H , it is obvious that if P is a solution for the Route(N , H, F) problem, then it is a solution for the
Route(N , F, F) problem. Then, from Theorem 9, P has the values given by (21). Moreover, since P is the solution of
Route(N , H, F) then cli − cii ≤ 0 for all i ∈ R(F, H) and l ∈ [m]\{i}, that is from (23) the inequality (22) holds. 
5. Conclusions
In this paper we started a possible polynomial classification of the 2mn supports for the Route(N , F, S) problem.
We considered those supports with at most one forbidden link per agent, thus this classification, parameterized with
α and β, reduces to at most mn2 classes of supports, see Fig. 4. We have shown, for some classes with identical links
and at most one forbidden link per agent, necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
These conditions allow us to verify the existence of a Nash equilibrium, with a given support matrix and a constraint
matrix in O(mn) time and, if the equilibrium exists, to calculate the Nash probabilities in O(mn) time.
We give also necessary and sufficient conditions to determine when and if the network remains in the same
equilibrium if some constraints are relaxed. These conditions can be verified in O(n) time. As a consequence, if we
have a Nash equilibrium for Static-Route(N , F) problem, then we can verify the existence of a solution for Dynamic-
Route(N , H, F) problem in O(n) time. Since the solution of the Dynamic-Route(N , H, F) problem (if it exists) is
also the solution of the Static-Route(N , F) problem, then we can solve the Dynamic-Route(N , H, F) problem in
O(1) extra time. A natural question is to investigate the computational complexity of finding a solution for the general
Route(N , F, S) problem.
The conditions examined here are intended as a proof of concept to show that it is possible to carry ahead a
systematic study of all the classes. Anyway it is clear that the Nash equilibrium associated to a given class of supports
might also not be the best (in terms of social cost). Moreover we cannot even compare it with the optimum. Thus
a natural problem is whether there exists an alternative classification of supports which allows us to evaluate the
equilibrium found with respect to the social cost of the optimum one.
Finally an interesting question is to study when and overall if is it the case that the static version of the problem is
easier than the dynamic one? In this paper we have shown, see the Examples, that the problem is not trivial.
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